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Symposium Articles

Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?*
Jonathan D. Bick**
Introduction
Economic activity in the United States and other countries
in the developed world relies on the production and dissemination of information. Some of that information has intrinsic
value and is likely to be protected by certain property rights.
Other types of information form the contractual basis for
America's, and much of the world's commercial system. The
communication of both types of information is subject to existing law. Existing American laws, which govern the communication of these types of information, are based on the concept
* This paper is adopted from a lecture given at the 1998 Pace Law Review
Symposium, Untangling the Web: The Legal Implications of the Internet at Pace

University School of Law on March 20, 1998. Please note that several of the
footnotes have subsequently been updated. This paper does not attempt to present
a complete analysis of why the Internet should be treated in a special manner.
Rather, it is only concerned with justifying the position that current law must be
applied in a special manner to accommodate a new communication medium. To do
so, it attempts to highlight pragmatic issues and identify existing applications of
law that impinge upon the Internet.
** Jonathan D. Bick, Esq. has served as an attorney with IBM for the last
sixteen years focusing on commercial and tax law including customer agreements,
acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures, federal and state income tax, non-income
tax, and international taxation. Mr. Bick is the author of the chapter Computer
Software in PROPERTY TAXATION (2d ed.) published by the Institute of Property
Taxation, and the article Internet Access Services Not Subject to New York Sales
Tax, recently published in the New York Law Journal. In addition to his duties at
IBM, Mr. Bick is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law
where he has taught courses in computer law and presently teaches a course in
Internet Law. He received an L.L.M. in taxation from the Georgetown Law
Center, and his J.D. from Seton Hall. He also holds an M.B.A. from Cornell
University.
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of geographical sovereignty. Due in part to the digitization of
information,' the availability of personal computers, and the
existence of the Internet, the flow of information defies geographical boundaries. Therefore, the application of existing
American law may have to be applied to Internet transactions
differently than in any prior transactions.
What began several decades ago as a technological undertaking 2 by the United States Defense Department and a small
number of research oriented American universities, 3 has developed into the leading edge of an information tidal wave 4 known
as the Internet. 5 What was once an arcane communication
method is now commonly thought of as a public utility. 6 Some
Internet service providers 7 have even sought protection from liability under the privilege afforded communication common
1. Digitization of information means the encoding of information into a series
of l's and O's.
2. To be specific, the task was simply the creation of a "set of connections
among university and research lab computers." HENRY H. PERRITT, LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 13 (1996).
3. See KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY 8-10

(Ejan Mackaay et al. eds., 1995) (stating that in the mid-sixties, a United States
Defense Department organization asked university researchers to develop a computer telecommunications network. The network that they developed ultimately
became the Internet). For more details related to the historical development of the
Internet, see Douglas Dangerfield, Web Surfing, or The Internet for the Uniformed,
15 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1996, at 12 and KEN D.
LINE LAW, xv-xvi (1997).

STUCKEY,INTERNET AND

ON-

4. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997) (Dalzell, J., concurring) (stating that "[iut is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country - and indeed the world has yet seen."); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DISMANTLING THE
BARRIERS TO GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3-4 (1997); Amy Harmon, U.S. in
Shift, Drops Its Effort to Manage Internet Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at
Al.
5. The Internet (interconnected networks) is a global grid of conversing computers. The terms "Internet," "information superhighway," and "World Wide Web"
(WWW or the Web) are generally used interchangeably according to Howard E.
Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg, How Electronic Commerce Works, TAX NOTES

May 12, 1997, at 1574.
6. See Lizette Alvarez, Internet is New Pet Issue in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1998, § 1, at 4; Jeffrey Rose, So What do the Internet and the World Wide Web
INT'L,

Mean to Me and How Can I Use Them in My Practice?, 39 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER
10 (Apr. 1998).

7. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is usually a firm offering telephone access to the Internet.
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carriers. This plea for protection is substantiated by the commonly expressed view that the Internet is now "an appliance of
8
every day life."
Contrary to the "Wild West" comparisons 9 and other hype
published by the popular press, 10 the Internet has yet to wreak
havoc on existing law in the United States. The American judicial system seems to have taken Internet transactions in stride
and adjudicated Internet matters on a significant number of occasions. 1 ' Still, Internet transactions should be treated differently from other transactions because the Internet allows
interactions that have previously been impossible. Those unprecedented interactions have inevitably unveiled numerous,
12
previously unforeseen difficulties.
Suggestions that the Internet has created an artificial economic environment and a synthetic society without law have
proved to be merely myth. In fact, the Securities and Exchange
8. The Clinton Administration published a White House Paper shortly after
the ACLU decision was rendered by the Supreme Court. That report described the
Internet as a communication arrangement, which "empowers citizens and democratizes societies." The Administration's assessment of the Internet extolled the
emergence of the Internet, stating:
Once a tool reserved for scientific and academic exchange, the Internet has
emerged as an appliance of every day life, accessible from almost every point
on the planet. Students across the world are discovering vast treasure
troves of data via the World Wide Web. Doctors are utilizing tele-medicine
to administer off-site diagnoses to patients in need. Citizens of many nations are finding additional outlets for personal and political expression.
The Internet is being used to reinvent government and reshape our lives
and our communities in the process.
9. See, e.g., Crimes of the 'Net', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 46; John W. Verity, The Internet, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1994, at 80; Net Watch, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at
20.
10. See Amy Harmon, The Law Where There is No Land, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
1998, at D1 (referring to the Internet as the "Wild West of the information age");
Jerry W. Thomas, Brave New World, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J., Jan. 1998, at 8-9 (stating
that the "impact of the Internet... [is] ... clouded by the confusion ...

attendant

to the birth of a new technology ").
11. A recent LEXIS search on the term "Internet" revealed 345 federal cases
involving that term. The search included two Supreme Court cases (Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communications Commission, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)), fifty-two
United States Court of Appeals cases, and nearly three hundred district court
cases.
12. See David G. Post, Anarchy, State and the Internet: An Essay on LawMaking in Cyberspace (visited Apr. 30, 1998) <http://www.wm.edullaw/publications/jol/post.html>.
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Commission, 13 the Food and Drug Administration, 14 and other
agencies have successfully claimed jurisdiction over parts of the
Internet as a part of their mandate. Also, a petition has been
filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), "requesting the initiation of rulemaking proceedings 'defining permissible communications over the Internet."' 15 Nevertheless,
an argument can be made that the American legal system in
general, and government agencies in particular, should treat
transactions involving the Internet in a unique manner.
The Internet penetrates many aspects of business and personal life. For example, in preparation for a recent trip to Europe, I used the Internet to review transportation schedules,
acquire airline tickets, request car rentals, and make train,
ferry, restaurant, and hotel reservations. During the trip, I also
used the Internet to set up, confirm, and reschedule meetings
with friends and business acquaintances in five countries. The
Internet also provided a source of entertainment and news.
Upon returning home, I bought a Volvo directly from the factory, sent thank you notes, and paid trip-related bills using the
Internet.
The Internet has also changed the way businesses do business. For instance, the International Business Machines Credit
Corporation (ICC) abandoned its paper law books in favor of an
Internet legal database. 16 Additionally, since some songs are
now free from physical form, there may be no need to visit a
record store or handle a compact disc in order to listen to new
music. Well-known artists, such as David Bowie and Duran
13. The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) granted Real Goods Trading Corporation its approval to trade stock on the Internet by issuing them a noaction letter dated June 24, 1996, and Spring Street Brewery made an initial public offering of its stock over the Internet in 1996 with the SEC's concurrence. See
Christina K. McGlosson, Who Needs Wall Street? The Dilemma of Regulating Securities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 43 (1997) (providing
more information regarding the SEC's claim of jurisdiction over part of the
Internet).
14. See Wayne L. Pines, New Challenges for Medical Product Promotion and
Its Regulation, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 61 (1997).

15. Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC JurisdictionOver Internet Telephony, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 43 (1997) (quoting America's Carriers Telecom-

munication Association Petition, In re Provision of Interstate and International
Interexchange Telecommunication Service (visited Mar. 4, 1996) <http:l/
www.FCC.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/other/acta.pet.html>).
16. The author was personally involved in this transaction.
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Duran, have released songs through the Internet. Thus, the
dissemination of strings of 1's and O's has joined records, tapes,
and discs as a channel of music distribution.
From an advanced legal perspective, the Internet has
raised novel questions with respect to the application of criminal law, contracts, torts, intellectual property, and other areas
of the law. The Internet was built to be a communication system 17 and is now used by an immense number of people to create seemingly binding obligations. The validity of those
contracts is yet to be analyzed, particularly from the standpoint
8
of which laws, and especially, whose laws, are applicable.'
The accessible nature of the Internet allows individuals to
communicate with a vast number of people, whether such communication is intentional or not. Thus, a defamatory statement
or a file containing a computer virus can be distributed worldwide in a matter of minutes. The law of torts, which is generally understood to make people responsible for their actions and
inactions, must invent new duties of care, and possibly new
remedies with respect to the Internet. 19
The Internet is populated by protected intellectual property. The most important are those intangible assets that enjoy
trademark and copyright protection. Until now, no definitive
relationship has been established between trademarks and the
unique Internet addresses known as "domain names." In addition, since copying information and data from one intermediary
computer to another is the essence of the Internet's communication technology, existing copyright laws that make such copying
a potential form of infringement must be reexamined.
Similarly, while crimes of trespass, wire fraud, unauthorized access, obscenity, transportation of stolen goods, and
threatening communications are all covered by existing crimi17. See KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3, at 8-10.
18. Some obvious choices are the plaintiffs domicile, the defendant's domicile,
the Internet server's location, the place the contract was performed, or a place
agreed upon by contract. Another option might be anywhere the transmission is
received.
19. Potential issues include: extent of liability for spreading an Internet computer virus accidentally; determining if attaching vital systems to the Internet or
the failure to back up computer systems connected to the Internet is tantamount to
contributory negligence; and what, if any, disclaimers absolve Internet users from
tort liability.
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nal statutes, the Internet still raises challenges regarding how
these crimes fit into the criminal justice system. For example,
how can a crime be sufficiently localized for prosecution when
the Internet is part of a criminal transaction? The lack of locality makes criminal judgments involving the Internet more difficult to enforce.
The ability to use the Internet to "project" an activity into a
jurisdiction presents another opportunity to circumvent criminal statutes. For instance, the French government banned a
book describing the decline in health of French President Mitterand, but French citizens were able to access the book on the
Internet. The Japanese government prohibits certain types of
gambling, but British bookmakers have used the Internet to allow Japanese citizens to participate in prohibited wagering.
The German government restricts neo-Nazi propaganda that
can nevertheless be found on the Internet.
Additionally, the Internet allows individuals to commit
crimes not previously considered possible. In United States v.
Morris,20 a computer program was sent across the Internet to
thousands of computers worldwide. The program caused those
computers which accepted it to shut down. 2 1 In United States v.
Baker,22 a student was jailed for violating Federal law23 after
posting a story accessible by millions, which graphically described the torture, rape, and murder of a woman who was
thought to be a classmate. 24 It should be noted that the District
25
Court subsequently dismissed the charges.
There is public opinion that the Internet is beyond existing
laws; such opinion springs from the underlying concept that the
Internet is new and somehow different. However, the Internet
has been fully commercialized for more than five years. 26 Dur20. 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
21. See id. at 506.
22. 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1998).
24. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379.
25. See id.
26. See KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3, at 10. On a more humorous and perhaps telling note, the July 5, 1993 edition of New Yorker magazine
contained a cartoon portraying a dog and a computer with the caption, "On the
Internet, nobody knows you're a dog." Id. at 57. This cartoon was cited as an indication that "[tihe Internet had risen far enough into the popular consciousness to
be laughed at," and thus marked a high degree of public awareness. Id. Similar
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ing that time, attorneys throughout the United States and the
world have been able to give clients a good idea of what to do
and how to proceed as clients' concerns arose. They were able
to do so by identifying underlying legal principles and by resorting to the development of appropriate analogies. Much of the
difficulty associated with Internet law arises when an attorney
attempts to reconcile the disparate advice given to various clients relating to Internet matters. Universal Internet legal principles are still elusive.
Clearly, the Internet has given birth to a spade of cases
that have raised a range of legal doctrinal issues. The United
States' anti-trust lawsuit against Microsoft, 27 as well as threats
of additional anti-trust litigation against Microsoft 28 by twelve
state attorney generals, begs the question: Can a company monopolize Internet access? White House aide Sidney Blumenthal's libel suit against Internet gossip columnist Matt
Drudge, 29 required that we ask what libel standards should be
used regarding the Internet where anyone can possibly be a
publisher. 30 Several recording companies have filed civil copyright infringement suits against Internet sites that allow users
to download music without permission from the copyright holders. These actions were undoubtedly brought to test the existing copyright law's ability to deal with the Internet.
Likewise, America Online's trespass and violation of privacy suits against several junk e-mail distributors raises the
conclusions concerning the New Yorker magazine cartoon have been made by The
Harvard Business Review, Business Week, and the American Bar Association. See
Debora Spar and Jeffrey J. Bussgang, The Net, 74 HARV. Bus. REV. 125 (1996);
Paul Eng and Julie Tilsner, Up All Night With the Internet, Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 1994,
at 14; G. Burgess Allison, Technology Update, 19 A.B.A. LAw PRACTICE MGMT. 8
(1993).
27. See Cliff Saran, US Software Group Forces Windows 98 Reshuffle on
Gates, COMPUTER WKLY., Apr. 23, 1998, at 4; David Lawsky, US: Judges Sharply

Question Government Lawyer on Microsoft, AAP

NEWSFEED,

Apr. 22, 1998, at 4-5;

Ann Davis, Microsoft Judge Taps a Pioneerof Internet Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
1997, at B1.
28. See Saran, supra note 27, at 4.
29. See Edward Felsenthal, A Web of Intrigue: The Internet's Bad Boy Has His
Day in Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at 1.
30. See David Stout, Suit Against Internet Service by Clinton Aide is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at A21. According to Stout, a Federal court
dismissed a libel suit against the Internet provider (America Online), but let stand
a libel suit against Matt Drudge, the Internet content writer. See id.
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question: Do attempts to block electronic mail violate the First
Amendment? The case of McVeigh v. Cohen 3' involved a sailor
who was discharged from the Navy after he posted a note on the
Internet in which he identified his marital status as "gay." The
McVeigh court suggested that the Navy and America Online violated a 1986 Federal law barring computer service companies
from releasing confidential information about customers without the person's permission or a court order. 32 Consequently, it
is difficult to argue that American courts have not been able to
cope with these new, previously undecided issues.
Attorneys who evaluate Internet transactions on a regular
basis have typically found that once speculative and hypothetical controversies are now replaced by real ones, and they tend
to find that the results seem reasonable and predictable. In
short, Internet matters usually do not require new modes of
thought, rather Internet transactions need only be treated differently. To be specific, the Internet is the quintessential product of the digitization phenomenon. It is a phenomenon that
has collapsed the boundaries among communication technologies. The toppling of the ambits between communication technologies is significant because the American legal system relies
almost exclusively on transmission technology to determine the
nature of the legal rights and obligations associated with a communication related activity. Consequently, a single Internet
transaction may be subject to a number of arguably conflicting
legal rights and obligations.
I.

A Longer Answer

From a legal perspective, tomes can be written describing
why Internet transactions might be treated differently from
non-Internet transactions. This writing will be limited to three
areas: (1) identifying certain transactions that are unique to the
Internet; (2) recognizing several special problems that have
arisen which have been perceived to be caused by the Internet's
use of digital communications; and (3) pinpointing a limited
number of uniquely Internet related legal issues.
31. 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998).
32. See id. at 220 (citing Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1998)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/4
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In order to best identify which transactions are unique to
the Internet, this writing will attempt to define the Internet.
This definition, though, will not speak in terms of technological
concepts and terminology. There are many excellent Internet
"how to" books and magazines on that topic. 33 Rather, the definition of the Internet will be phrased in terms of what the Internet can do.
Legal practitioners have found that while one can practice
Internet law dependably without the benefit of advanced training in computer science, an attorney's ability to give competent
legal advice regarding Internet transactions is dramatically enhanced by an understanding of the Internet. This is particularly true when such comprehension is combined with a
working knowledge of the Internet's limitations and potential.
The 1998 participants in the Internet Law Symposium at
Pace University School of Law ("the Symposium") have unearthed example after example of Internet transactions which,
on first blush, purportedly exposed blatant inadequacies in the
existing American legal system. Generally, these perceived inadequacies consisted of two types: i) either an Internet transaction was apparently not subject to any existing law, or ii) any
attempt to apply existing laws to a particular type of Internet
transaction resulted in an obvious violation of certain basic
legal concepts. Both inadequacies were illustrated by the appli34
cation of the First Amendment to the Internet.
Consider the following: certain information is deemed obscene in New York, but not in Ohio or New Jersey. An Ohio
Internet user using a home computer posts such material on a
server located in New Jersey. Sometime later, a seven-year-old
Internet user, located in New York, uses a home computer to
access the Internet via a New York ISP. He seeks out and reads
the material in question. At first glance, the purveyor of the
allegedly obscene material appears to be beyond the reach of
New York authorities. Alternatively, if the parents of the New
York minor complained to the appropriate New York authorities, who in turn prosecuted the New York ISP for trafficking of
33. See, e.g., PERRIrr, supra note 2, at 13; STUCKEY, supra note 5, at xv-xvi.
34. See Fred Cate, Indecency, Ignorance, and Intolerance: The First Amendment and the Regulation of Electronic Expression (article 5)-Part II (visited Apr.
30, 1998) <http://www.wm.edulaw/publications/jol/cate2.html>.
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obscene material, initially it would seem that the New York ISP
was being held responsible for actions beyond its control. This
presumes that the New York ISP had no knowledge of the obscene nature of the content it was passing.
After some ringing of hands, in almost every case the members of the Symposium saw that the legal gaps and the mismatches disappeared when exposed to the light of an
appropriate analogy. Symposium speakers and students alike
have found that even the most novel Internet questions can be
handled by analogy if one understands the similarities among
the new and existing technologies.
In the above example, the actions in Ohio and New Jersey
were legal (i.e., the posting of certain material on an Internet
server). However, they resulted in a potentially unlawful act in
New York (i.e., exposing a minor to material considered obscene), resulting in the New York court's ability to prosecute the
Ohio Internet user. While the Internet allows actors from different jurisdictions to raise challenges as to the appropriateness
of the jurisdiction of foreign criminal justice systems, their actions have reasonably foreseeable consequences, for which the
application of long arm statutes may result in criminal
culpability.
In considering the above hypothetical, the Symposium concentrated on analogies equating ISPs to common carriers and
concluded that the ISP common carrier privilege would provide
an appropriate liability shield. This analogy is firmly based on
the technical understanding that an ISP is one layer of a multilayered Internet communication infrastructure and has the two
most obvious components, as its name implies. 35 Specifically, it
is available to a broad range of the public for hire,36 and it is in
the business of communicating messages over which it has lim7
ited or no content control.3
35. These "common carrier" characteristics are not based on any single court
finding. Rather, they are the combination of findings of several prominent cases
that dealt with the definition of "common carrier."
36. Thus, satisfying the traditional "holding-out" test defined in BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 249 (5th ed. 1979).
37. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal
Communications Commission, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (considering services
operated by a common carrier and made available to the public).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/4
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The Symposium's search for appropriate analogies concerning the question of intermediary liability for a potentially obnoxious or offensive communication, with respect to ISPs, was
aided by researching cases concerning pre-1900 telegraph industry activity 38 and the mechanics of telephone, 39 radio, television, 40 cable television, 41 and telefacsimile (better known as
telefaxes, or simply, faxes) machinery. 42 The discussion set
forth in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,43 concerning the relative responsibility of conduits for harmful information in light of
a claim of defamation, was also useful in solidifying the
analogy.
38. See, e.g., Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869) (finding that offers and
acceptances by telegraph were as effective as offers and acceptances made by pen
for the purpose of satisfying the Statute of Frauds).
39. See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (holding that a legislative ban on certain speech was not constitutional because "the statute's denial of adult access to
telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is
necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages"). Note that the disputed
statute, section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(1834) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (amended 1988)) prohibited
both indecent and obscene commercial telephone messages. See Sable, 492 U.S. at
123.
40. Much like the Internet today, the emergence of radio and television broadcasting earlier this century brought a new technology into the world of mass media, and with it, new challenges of regulating within the boundaries of the First
Amendment. In the seminal case of Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica Foundation,438 U.S. 726 (1978), the Court considered whether the Federal Communications Commission had the power to regulate radio broadcast that
was indecent but was not obscene. The Court deliberated over whether a radio
broadcast of a George Carlin record, which included a number of objectionable
words, violated a federal statute that prohibited the broadcasting of certain material. See id. at 729-30. The Court established the extent to which the Federal
government may go to limit free speech broadcast on television and radio. See id.
at 778-80.
41. In cases dealing with cable television, the Supreme Court reiterated its
intent to apply First Amendment protection standards based on the characteristics
of the communication medium. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (endorsing different standards for different media); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 768
F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (indicating that the communication medium should be
assessed for First Amendment purposes by appropriate standards).
42. See, e.g., Jan Fritchard, Keeping the Fax Private, 52 J. Mo. B. 279 (1996).
43. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concerning the free flow of information
and highlighting the need to have knowledge of the defamation in order to implicate an intermediary and find liability).
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Generally, historical analogies have been useful guides. 44
However, contemporary perceptions of the role of emerging
technologies, including the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television, have often been vehemently amiss. 45 Since it is unlikely that the ultimate development of the Internet can be
predicted, it would be a mistake to formulate rules based on its
present state. Symposium members found that rather than developing a fixed set of black letter laws, which could be used to
understand the regulation of Internet related transactions, the
46
adaptation of existing laws and precedent would be sufficient.
The pace of legal developments regarding the Internet was
found to be frantic. 47 For example, it is anticipated that before a
federal appeals court can consider the fate of Microsoft's Windows 95 Internet access software, Windows 95 will be replaced
by Microsoft's Windows 98. Thus, it behooves Internet practitioners to stay abreast of contemporaneous court findings, as
well as technological changes in the Internet as they develop
advice based on analogies.
Digital phenomena, that is, the use of digital technology
rather than analog technology, has made certain Internet related transactions legally unique. This writing will attempt to
identify the perceived problems which have arisen due to the
Internet's use of digital communications. The digitalization
44. For example, what William M. Martin wrote in 1940 concerning telegraph
operators is applicable to Internet service providers: "The difficulty and inconvenience of requiring operators to analyze either the message or the senders from
either a factual or legal standpoint is manifest. The indispensability of the telegraph, on the other hand, is as unchallenged as the realization that speed is the
essence of its worth." William M. Martin, Telegraphs and Telephones, 2 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 141, 147 (1940).
45. See I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright Owners' Rights and Users' Privileges on
the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 423 (1997) (pointing out examples of how predictions of the future of a particular communication technology were inaccurate,
including the prediction that the telephone was too delicate an instrument for general use, or that closed circuit television would be a more commonly used
commodity).
46. This approach mimicked the finding in the plurality opinion set forth in
Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communications Commission, 518 U.S. 727, 741-742 (1996) (stating that no single analogy
was so appropriate as to allow the court to find a rigid standard that would be
applicable to all future media).
47. A similar finding was expressed in Kathy Rebello, Inside Microsoft, Bus.
WK., July 15, 1996, at 56 (stating, "Internet time: a pace so frenetic it's like living
dog years - each jammed with the events of seven normal ones").
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phenomenon has collapsed old boundaries of communication.
Unlike the past, specific transmission channel technologies are
no longer a reliable guide to the legal nature of the activity.
While some communication laws may need to be changed,
the core ideas of the legal subjects, which are affected by the
Internet, remain sound and viable. The Internet is not so revolutionary that all existing legal precepts must be abandoned
and replaced with new legal principles in a completely separate
Internet jurisdiction. 48 It is evident that the American legal
values that have evolved over the past two centuries and that
have been incorporated into American jurisprudence will apply
to Internet transactions.
Because the Internet allows certain unique types of communication, some Internet transactions pose potentially novel
challenges for legal practitioners. For example, the application
of liability to an Internet communication intermediary is a
unique Internet matter, whereas the originator of an Internet
electronic mail message is not. The originator will generally be
in the same legal position as he or she would be if the content
were on paper. Other uniquely Internet related issues include
the appropriate determination of jurisdiction for Internet related civil and criminal matters, as well as a proper nexus for
tax matters. This is primarily because the American legal system's tradition is based on geographically defined sovereign
boundaries.
II.

What Are the Characteristics That Made the
Internet Special?

In order to understand why Internet transactions should be
treated differently, one must first consider what the Internet is.
I am the father of three young children, all of whom are more
Internet literate than me. Therefore, I need only draw on my
personal experience at home to give a working definition of the
Internet, not based on what it is, but what it does.
48. See Stephan Wilske et al., International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 50
L.J. 117 (1997); Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymity and International
Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231
(1996).
FED. COMM.

13

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:41

Recently, my nine-year-old son was explaining the Internet
to my six-year-old daughter. This is the same nine-year-old
who, when angered by his mother, sought his revenge by using
the Internet to circumvent the DuPont Corporation security
system. He changed the password on her Du Pont issued computer, thereby locking her out of her PC for several hours.
Since Alexander is nine, needless to say, he did not tell six-yearold Emily that the Internet is an international plexus of computer networks connected to each other through common routers, using Transport Control and Internet Protocols (TCP/IP)
and sharing common name and address space conventions.
Although true, this information is not very useful to most attorneys or six-year-old sisters. Rather, Alexander told Emily that
the Internet is like a book because you can look things up in it;
but, it is more. It is like a fax because you can send and get
pictures, like Aunt Julie does of her new baby; but, it does more.
It is like a newspaper because once you put something in it, you
don't know who will read it or how many times it will be copied;
and yet it is still more. It is like television and radio because it
does not cost anything extra to send a message to five or five
million people, and it is like the mail or the telephone because
you can send or receive a private message. Alexander summed
it up by telling Emily the Internet is like a Swiss Army knife, a
single tool that can do the same job as many other tools.
After hearing Alexander's explanation, it has been instructional to treat the Internet as a book, a fax, a letter system, a
newspaper, a phone system, a radio, and a television system.
This treatment has allowed the use of a cornucopia of potentially useful analogies. By defining the Internet in terms of
what it can do, instead of what it is, a practitioner can immediately identify potential legal issues and the sources of potential
analogies.
A working definition of the Internet based on what it does,
rather than what it is, highlights two major reasons why the
American legal system should treat the Internet differently.
First, the Internet involves potentially the same transactions as
many existing communication technologies (i.e., books, faxes,
letters, newspapers, phones, radio, and television). Thus, the
Internet potentially allows people to act like and share the
same rights and obligations as a publisher, a common carrier,
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and a broadcaster. This definition also highlights the fact that
the Internet does the same thing as many communication technologies, but due to a technological change, does not do it the
same way.
Second, the Internet appears to be able to do what a combination of many existing technologies already do today. This is
important to note because each one of these existing technologies has a nearly complete set of legal principles, based on different underlying assumptions, precedents, and rules and
regulations. Because our legal system reveres precedent and
relies on analogy, the legal doctrines that define the rights and
obligations of a given communication technology, such as print
or broadcast, can each be visualized as a separate monolith or
ionic column. Each monument or column is planted on a different base and is pointed upward to a different point in space.
Consequently, the principles and legal doctrines that have
evolved for different technologies may conflict. As evidence of
this, one need only look as far as the Communications Act of
1934, 49 which governs radio and television transmissions, and
cable communications. There was no attempt to intellectually
integrate the governing doctrines. Additionally, the regulations
came from completely different places. The doctrines governing
terrestrial telecommunication common carriers were adopted
wholesale from the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.50
The regulation of the telephone common carrier was based
on market entry price controls imposing a duty to furnish communication services upon reasonable request. The doctrines
governing radio and television came from the Radio Act of
1927.51 The original theme of broadcast regulation was to ration the public spectrum's use and impose a public service obligation: that the public interest and necessity would be served.
Until the Internet sprang into existence, separate legal doctrines concerning communication transactions could co-exist.
However, the digital phenomena has led to the destruction of
existing communication technology boundaries. The very na49. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq. (1998)).
50. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
51. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
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ture of the Internet is forcing the American legal community to
re-evaluate substantial amounts of substantive law.
As indicated previously, the Internet penetrates many aspects of American life, and consequently, many aspects of American law. While it may be beneficial to address a large number
of Internet related transactions, addressing Internet transactions in a general way tends to lead to conclusions with little
relevancy. Therefore, the implications of only two Internet
transactions are considered below: Internet transactions related to the First Amendment and copyright protection.
First Amendment concerns and Internet matters are intertwined. Internet transactions have special value because they
are part of a technology that allows the free flow of information,
which is a central concern of the First Amendment. 52 The First
Amendment exerts itself by limiting liability on tort actions like
defamation, which limits efforts of federal, state, and local governments to restrict access to public information and limits governmental efforts to control content. This exertion is readily
and directly applicable to the Internet.
The Internet represents the convergence of different technologies and economic markets. Specifically, the Internet combines common carrier, broadcasting, and print transactions.
Each technology and associated market has a very different
First Amendment legal tradition. For example, telephone companies and media broadcasting firms have been heavily regulated, while newspapers and magazines have enjoyed broad
First Amendment immunity from regulation.
Moreover, while newspaper publishers have strong First
Amendment protections, telephone firms waived their First
Amendment privileges to assume common carrier status. Consequently, in the case of the Internet, we find a juxtaposition of
interests where a publisher's content control, arguably the most
critical characteristic of a publisher's First Amendment privilege, is inconsistent with regulations necessary for a telephone
common carrier.5 3 Thus, Internet transactions will most likely
be treated differently from other First Amendment
transactions.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. Telephone and telegraph services were declared to be common carriers by
the Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, sec. 7, §1, 36 stat. 539, 544-45 (1910).
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The area of copyright protection presents another set of
perplexing issues when existing law is applied to Internet
transactions.
Among the most interesting concerns is the use of
"caching"54 of information by Internet applications. 55 In a nutshell, it can be argued that since caching requires that data is
56
copied, and since the Internet extensively relies on caching,
Internet users are engaged in the most pernicious infringement
of copyrighted material in history. While this conclusion is
often cited, the conclusions that may be drawn from this set of
57
facts vary.
Under existing law, a copy, even if temporary, is a copy for
the purpose of applying copyright law. In the area of computers, the courts have found that copying computer data or
software into a computer constitutes the production of a copy for
copyright purposes. 58 Most users (infringers) are unaware of
the cached copies, which are created by merely using an Internet browser such as Netscape's Navigator or Microsoft's Internet Explorer.
The existing law could respond in a number of ways. Caching, which is preventable, may be deemed infringement. However, the Fair Use Doctrine 59 of the U.S. Copyright law will
likely be applied in an expansive way to cover unintentional
copying on a case by case basis. Alternatively, the courts could
find an implied license created by Internet content suppliers
which permit caching. In short, it is likely that Internet trans54. Caching is the temporary storage of network data and information that is
made in order to improve the overall performance of the network. It is used by
many Internet applications to reduce the access time for subsequent use of Internet files.
55. It should be noted that the Internet relies upon copying information and
data in other ways as well. The Internet is composed of a network of computers.
In order for data to travel to its ultimate destination, it is generally broken up into
data "packets" and routed through many computers. Each computer en route
makes a copy as part of the transmission process.
56. An argument can be made that caching is not essential for the productive
use of the Internet and that caching is merely a temporary response to the existing
Internet network. See Hardy, supra note 45, at 429. However, existing Internet
technology relies on caching.
57. See id. at 452-53.
58. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); see also Triad Systems Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1995).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
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actions will be treated differently than other copyright
transactions.
The digital phenomena made the Internet special because
it collapsed old boundaries of communication technologies. The
digital phenomena 60 is at the heart of the technological change
that made the Internet unique among communication technologies. The Internet, like other forms of publication, provides
value by providing content. Content is the basic message or
data with nothing provided to help a user find, get, file or look
at information.
Most information providers add value to the content by dividing it into pages and by identifying the order and nature of
the content. More sophisticated information products have
cross-references, like indexes or tables of contents, that internally point to another part of the product. The Internet has
pointers called "hyperlinks," which add a new dimension to
cross-referencing. They not only point to new material, but also
enable the user to procure an original copy of an information
source. The user may then distribute it all with the click of a
mouse.
Hyperlinking and the other results of the convergence of
different communication technologies are principally due to the
effects of the digital phenomena. That is, the movement of most
forms of electronic communication from analog representation
to digital representation. Understanding the distinction between analog and digital communications is pivotal in understanding why the Internet must be treated differently. Analog
communication involves waves. Analog technology works by
copying the sound wave or the light wave with an electronic
wave and sending it. The prime example is the airwave created
when a person speaks. Technological analog communication is
exemplified by the original method used by Alexander Graham
Bell in the telephone, a method that has remained dominant in
the telecommunications field until recently. Analog techniques
are also used for the vast majority of radio and television
broadcasts.
60. The digital phenomena, sometimes referred to as "convergence," is the
confluence of all significant media streams. It exists due to the maintenance of a
communication transport mechanism that reduces every major sort of media (including text, image, audio, and video) to a common communication channel.
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Digital communication technology works by taking millions
of static samples of sound or light waves each minute and reducing them to computer bits. These bits are sent to machines
that combine them to make pictures and sounds. Digital data
technology makes it possible to use information in the digital
content to permit routing and addressing. Only a single channel is required by digital technology to be sent on parallel paths.
Analog technology requires a separate and parallel channel to
be established for routing and addressing purposes, a channel
that must remain intact during the entire duration of the analog transmission.
Digital technology reduces text, image, and audio to a common transmission media. This allows the easy combination of
various types of information representations. Digital information or data, as embodied in the Internet, also has the characteristic of being quick and easy to replicate. These
62
characteristics are not present in other static61 or dynamic
communication technologies.
Another central feature of digital information or data is
that each copy is as good as the original. These characteristics
are not found in either analog or print technologies. If each
copy is in all respects identical to the original, and if we accept
the traditional privilege - that anyone can read a copyrighted
work when one possesses it - then a copyright holder's reproduction right has no value. This follows from the fact that the
traditional distinction between reading (never within the copyright monopoly) and reproducing it (always within the copyright monopoly) vanishes.
It can be argued that Internet transactions need to be
treated in the same "revolutionary" manner that, for example,
torts have been. That is to say, Internet transactions like tort
transactions should be separately grouped and taught as a unit.
In support of this contention, one need only look at the cases
that have dealt with the application of existing law to the Internet. It appears that the courts have had a difficult time
squaring their Internet related decisions with existing decisions. Proponents of the "Internet requiring revolutionary
61. Such as newspapers or other print technologies.
62. Such as standard telephone, radio, television, or analog technologies.
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treatment" position might point to the newly established tort
law, which was developed because the courts had a difficult
time squaring tort related decisions with then existing decisions. During the hundreds of years prior to the development of
modern tort law, people were still liable for their actions, but
63
the liability arose under a wide variety of legal theories.
Proponents of the position that the Internet must be
treated in a revolutionary manner might also point out that
prior to Justice Louis Brandeis' establishment of the "revolutionary" right to privacy, 64 courts experienced some difficulty
articulating the basis for certain decisions. It can be argued
that Internet rights, like the right of privacy, must be discovered. It may ultimately be determined that the use of the Internet gives rise to one or more new forms of rights or
obligations. Yet another possibility is the "revolutionary" redefining of existing legal concepts. For example, changing the
word "copying" from "tangible reproduction" to something more
abstract would be more applicable to the transient appearance
of data or information in a computer. This might lead to the
65
development of new copyright laws.
There is a division between those who would like to see incremental change and those who prefer radical change. 66 The
more radical group indicates that due to the Internet, America
is entering a shift from an industrial based economy to a knowledge and information based economy. They argue that this
change will be as radical as the change of the American society
from agrarian to industrial. They point out that the American
legal system is strongly based on geographically defined entities
and that Internet information flows freely across geographical
boundaries. This presents problems for determining both civil
and criminal jurisdiction. They further argue that this informa63. See PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1-16 (9th ed. 1994).
Prosser also points out that separate rules of liability developed around specific
types of action (such as different forms of trespass) because various torts which are

recognized today grew out of different historical common law forms of action. See
id.
64. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
65. See Hardy, supra note 45, at 462.
66. See Amy Harmon, We, the People of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
1998, at B1.
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tion flow causes irreconcilable jurisdictional difficulties. In addition, they contend that Internet technology has produced new
types of disputes while diminishing the feasibility of traditional
methods for discovering unlawful conduct and enforcing traditional legal remedies. Some adherents to this line of thought
maintain that a separate Internet jurisdiction must be established and that all new legal principles be created. Others have
argued that since the Internet is limited by existing protocol
and technology, it necessarily creates its own rules. 67 Still,
others have suggested that a body of private international law
68
that incorporates centuries of trade law practice should apply.
Nevertheless, most practitioners and commentators do not
deny that technological change has always been a source of
problems that the American legal system has successfully addressed. One need only look at the legal changes wrought in
employment relations by the Industrial Revolution, or how the
automobile altered the nature of personal injury claims. A
quick read of the American legal system's handling of past technological advances demonstrates that the challenges presented
by the Internet may be evolutionary, although not revolutionary. 69 Previously, the American legal system has neatly accommodated the telegraph, telephone, television, and fax.
In fact, many of the ideas presented in the legal integration
of those technologies into the then existing American legal system are still valid today. The Symposium students have often
consulted law review articles of the past to help them formulate
legal models for the Internet law challenges of today. For example, a 1920 Columbia Law Review article considered the difficulties faced by a telegraph operator who had to determine
whether a message was defamatory, and thus decide whether to
send it or not.70 The concerns expressed in this article are as
relevant today to Internet intermediary computer providers, Internet bulletin board service providers, and Internet service
67. See Post, supra note 12.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10, 81, 82 (1982).
69. The Internet is often referred to as being a "revolutionary" change in communication or as a part of a communications revolution. See Ilene Gotts, Communications Law, NAT'L L.J., June 14, 1994, at B6.
70. See Y.B. Smith, Liability for a Telegraph Company for Transmittinga Defamatory Message, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1920); see also PERRITT, supra note 2, at
18-21.
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providers in general, as they were to telegraph firms and telegraph operators shortly after the turn of the century.
The same quandary is presumably faced today by Internet
service providers who are at peril for transmitting or posting
potentially defamatory material. Because legal changes lag behind technological changes, it comes as no surprise that the
American legal system has not already resolved all the difficulties presented by the Internet. The American market system
has thrived in part because our system tries not to predetermine the course of technological change. It merely makes itself
available for dispute resolution when private accommodation
and market mechanisms fail. While our existing legal system
will most likely be able to accommodate Internet law, it should
concentrate on the application of law to new classes of litigants
such as Internet intermediaries of Internet publishers. Since
neither of these classes previously existed, it is only natural
that no legal precedent is available to guide them.
III.

Uniquely Internet Issues

The Internet has bred a new, unique class of litigants and
judicial matters. One new issue involves novel jurisdiction. For
example, in U.S. v. Thomas,71 a California couple violated a federal obscenity criminal statute and was convicted in Tennessee,
even though their obscene posting was on a server in California.
A second type of uniquely Internet related matter involves copyright protection and caching. This is particularly important because existing infringement laws do not require intent or
knowledge in order to find infringement.
71. 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Thomas owned and operated a bulletin board service which relied upon a computer located in California, from which
users could download pornographic images. See id. In 1994, Mr. Thomas was arrested and convicted by a jury in Tennessee on several counts of distributing obscene material via his bulletin board in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465. See id. He
was subsequently indicted in Utah for several counts relating to the distribution of
child pornography via his bulletin board in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and
(2). See id. Mr. Thomas moved to dismiss the Utah indictment on the grounds of
double jeopardy arising out of his Tennessee prosecution and sentencing. See id.
After the denial of his motions to dismiss, Mr. Thomas entered a guilty plea on one
of the counts and was sentenced to a prison term, which ran concurrently with his
Tennessee sentence. See Thomas, 113 F.3d at 1247.
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A less obvious class of uniquely Internet litigants is a particular type of Internet service providers that can be divided
into three basic groups. The first two groups, conduits and content providers, fit comfortably within established legal categories. The third group, store-and-forward Internet services
providers, do not.
Conduits are Internet service providers that provide services involving little or no content alteration. They look and act
like telephone and telegraph companies, which historically have
had common carrier obligations and benefitted from judicially
acknowledged privileges. These privileges have resulted in
favorable treatment under the law of torts, either because of
their common carrier duties or because of the fiction that they
merely provide communication links and do not actually republish information.
In short, courts have regularly limited the liability of common carriers for the transmission of defamatory communications and have often found that telephone companies merely
provide facilities, not reproductions. They are usually asked to
implement electronic eavesdropping, and typically have an obligation to do so. They also normally have common law nondisclosure obligations and must take reasonable steps to prevent
third parties from intercepting communications. In defamation
law, conduits can escape liability under the "sealed container"
doctrine, unless there is no upstream producer available to pay
a judgment. In such cases, even a faultless conduit may be liable in order to avoid placing the loss on an innocent consumer.
Content providers are the Internet service providers who
own the content. They are almost like publishers, and enjoy a
publisher's First Amendment rights, which limit their tort and
criminal liabilities with respect to the content they publish.
This makes them much more vulnerable than the conduits.
Store-and-forward Internet service providers do both, and can
arguably be governed by both sets of doctrines.
Internet law should concentrate on the liability of intermediaries because originators of electronic information content are in the same legal position they would be if their content
were on paper. The Internet structure is composed of many layers. Even the simplest Internet transaction usually involves a
user's computer, an Internet service provider's access computer,
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a regional router, a governmental backbone computer, another
regional router, another Internet service provider's computer,
and a content provider's computer. So, even in the simplest
transactions, there are many more intermediaries than users or
content providers.
In most of the potential intermediary liability areas the
finding of fault is a necessary element in the assessment of liability. In copyright law, fault is not a prerequisite to liability.
Consequently, an intermediary, who is only acting as a conduit
and has neither control over the content nor vouches for its
quality, is exposed to a great deal of liability. This lack of fault
required for liability could have significant impact for Internet
intermediaries.
There are some cases that address the liability of Internet
intermediaries. However, their message is not clear. Consider
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,72 where a federal district court,
clearly interested in maintaining information flow, found that
an Internet intermediary was not liable for defamation in the
absence of evidence that it knew or should have known about
the harmful information flowing through its service. In Cubby,
a newsletter that allegedly defamed the plaintiffs was uploaded
by its publisher onto a database maintained on CompuServe's
computers. 73 The court characterized CompuServe's service as
a for-profit library. 74 It indicated that CompuServe had no general duty to inspect the content it was carrying. 75 This position
76
is completely in accord with generally accepted tort law.
The Internet has given birth to a new type of intermediary
between the content creator and the user, who will ultimately
consume the information. The earliest examples of this new
type of intermediary are the Internet electronic bulletin boards.
While it appears to the end user that he or she is getting his or
her information directly from the content creator, it is actually
being delivered by one or more intermediaries.
An Internet page usually presents a user with a highlighted text string, called a hyperlink. A user gets the informa72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

776
See
See
See
See

F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
id. at 138.
id. at 140.
id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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tion by clicking on the hyperlink. The user's action causes the
server displaying the pointer to download special computer information, known as a universal resource locator, to the user's
computer and then disconnects. The user's computer, running
Internet software, connects to another computer and receives
more information, and so on and so forth. Thus, information
allegedly infringing upon another's copyright may move
through several intermediaries in this distribution system. The
potential liability of various intermediaries for copyright infringement is a matter of obvious interest both to the intermediaries and to the copyright owner alleging infringement.
The copyright holder is more likely to find intermediaries,
such as IBM, America On-line, or CompuServe, more eligible
candidates to sue than end users, because they have deeper
pockets and are more amenable to personal jurisdiction. For example, in Playboy Enterprises v. Frena,77 the District Court
found that an Internet intermediary, which ran a dial-up electronic bulletin board service, was liable for copyright and trademark infringement for material available through its service,
without the plaintiff having to prove that the intermediaries
knew of the infringing nature of the content. 78 Moreover, copyright infringement claims arose from the on-line use of copyrighted photographs owned by the plaintiff.7 9 The photos in
question were claimed to have been downloaded by one or more
of the defendant's customers.8 0 However, because the plaintiffs
trademarks were replaced by the defendant's advertising, this
claim was questionable. Based on the standard of strict liability
for direct infringement, the court disregarded Frena's defense of
lack of actual knowledge.8 1
IV.

Conclusion

The Internet causes tension among many elements worldwide. Such tension exists between intellectual property owners
who need a stable set of rules to make appropriate business decisions and the worldwide need for broad freedoms of speech to
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

839
See
See
See
See

F.
id.
id.
id.
id.

Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
at 1556.
at 1554.
at 1560.
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ensure fundamental human rights. The Internet cases that
arose in 1998 and in prior years can be read to imply there is a
stable set of expectations which will lead to predictable results
in the near future with respect to the Internet. Consequently,
Internet attorneys must recognize that the Internet is a new
medium for sharing information and must treat Internet transactions differently than any other prior transactions.
While the Internet does represent an evolutionary convergence of technologies as a result of expanded use of digitization,
it is not a revolutionary change. It is premature to suggest that
America scrap the legal doctrines created to deal with other information technologies. Rather, legal issues of derivative
works, rights of privacy, theory of trademark dilution, and
others are adequately addressed by existing legal theories if applied correctly.
Most legal precepts can be adopted without much difficulty
to deal with the novel challenges posed by the Internet. Media
reports highlighting the vulnerability of privacy and intellectual property on the Internet tend to be sensationalistic rather
that scholarly. For example, adequate laws already exist to
punish intellectual property infringers and those who initiate
damage while using the Internet.
While legislatures should focus on real problems, such as
whether a server located in a jurisdiction constitutes a valid
nexus for jurisdictional purposes, or whether access to the Internet is a taxable activity, they need not criminalize what is
already criminal activity or make a special tort for what is already tortious conduct. Legislatures may want to act to restrain frivolous suits as Congress has protected Internet
intermediaries such as Internet service providers with the Telecommunication Act of 1996.2 Technological fixes have evolved
to address issues as well, such as the problem of one Internet
83
site using the pages of another site without permission.
Suggestions that the American legal system will be crushed
by the worldwide infrastructure of the Internet are alarmist.
82. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
83. One example is the use of programming techniques which force Internet
site users to enter a site at a designated domain name. See Bradley J. Hillis,
Thinking about Linking, (visited May 19, 1998) <http://www.llrx.com/features/
weblink2.htm>.
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As in the past, America can enforce legal obligations and a standard of conduct against natural persons within the United
States and against corporations with physical assets located
within its boundaries. This has always been the cornerstone of
legal jurisdiction.
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